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Abstract and Keywords
Spontaneous thoughts occur by default in the interstices between directed, task-oriented
thoughts or moments of perceptual scrutiny. Their contents are overwhelmingly related to
thinkers’ current goals, either directly or indirectly via associative networks, including
past and future goals. Their evocation is accompanied by emotional responses that vary
widely in type, valence, and intensity. Given these properties of thought flow, spontaneous
thoughts are highly adaptive as (1) reminders of the individual’s larger agenda of goals
while occupied with pursuing any one of them, (2) promotion of planning for future goal
pursuits, (3) deeper understanding of past goal-related experiences, and (4) development
of creative solutions to problems in goal pursuit. The same mechanisms may occasion
repetitive but unproductive thoughts about the pursuit, the consequences of the failure,
or the self, and strong negative emotions steering the train of thought may lead to
narrowing of its focus, thus producing rumination.
Keywords: spontaneous thought, adaptive, goal, rumination, emotion

Under normal conditions, the brain never just rests. As circumstances change from, for
example, focusing on tasks to seemingly aimless musing, or from waking to the various
phases of sleep (or the reverse of these), the parts of the brain that are most active
change from one set to another. Studies of the contents of consciousness have long
recognized this apparently unceasing activity, and the technology of brain imaging has
permitted researchers to gradually reveal the neural reality that underlies it. Two
important generalizations have emerged from these studies, which are also central
components of the goal theory of current concerns (Klinger, 1971, 1975, 1977, 2013;
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Klinger & Cox, 2011a): (a) spontaneous thought represents the mental baseline; (b) the
content of spontaneous thought is mainly related to personal goals.

Basic Properties of Spontaneous Thought
Spontaneous Mentation as Baseline or Default Mental State
First, as early observations suggested, spontaneous thought (in the sense of “unintended,
nonworking, non-instrumental mental content that comes to mind unbidden and
effortlessly”; Christoff, 2012, p. 52; Klinger, 2009) constitutes a baseline state of mental
activity that occurs irresistibly in the absence of instrumental, task-oriented mental
activity (Klinger, 1971). Spontaneous thought in this sense includes mostly such states as
mind-wandering and other forms of daydreaming. In parallel, early brain imagers
discovered that when their research participants turned from task mentation to mindwandering, certain brain structures, such as the posterior cingulate cortex, medial
prefrontal cortex, and (p. 216) possibly medial temporal lobe, predictably became
particularly active; they dubbed these the default mode network (e.g., Andrews-Hanna,
Reidler, Huang, & Buckner., 2010; Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler,
2009; Mason et al., 2007; Raichle et al., 2001; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maquet, &
D’Argembeau, 2011b)—“default” here carrying the same meaning as the earlier term
“baseline.”
To be clear, mind-wandering is not the only kind of conscious content that can be
observed while the default mode network is active. That is, other self-referential and
perceptually decoupled content may also occur (e.g., Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009).
Moreover, mind-wandering is often interwoven with executive systems (Christoff, 2012;
Christoff et al., 2009), with the default mode network being positively correlated with the
frontoparietal control network during internally focused tasks (e.g., Spreng, Stevens,
Chamberlain, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2010). Still, mind-wandering is clearly a prominent
part of the default mix (for a more extended discussion of the relationship between the
default mode network and mind-wandering, see Klinger, 2013).
Mind-wandering accounts on average for between about a third and a half of conscious
thoughts (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Klinger & Cox, 1987–1988). It would therefore
be surprising if it could have evolved in the absence of important contributions to human
functioning.

Content of Spontaneous Mentation as Principally Goal-Related
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A second important generalization is that the content of spontaneous waking thought and
dreaming is prominently related to the individual’s goal pursuits, directly or indirectly,
including metaphorically. For animal species, pursuit and adequate attainment of goals is,
of course, a categorical imperative for survival. Furthermore, progress toward one’s goals
is an important determinant of an individual’s positive affect (Klug & Maier, 2015). It is
therefore not surprising that a chief focus of thought, spontaneous and otherwise, is the
pursuit of an individual’s goals, great and small. The goal pursuits in mind-wandering are
mostly those in the individual’s current life, but may also, by association in spontaneous
mentation, be those of the past or contemplated future, as revealed through thought- or
dream-sampling using probes (Hoelscher, Klinger, & Barta, 1981; Klinger, 1978, 2009;
Nikles, Brecht, Klinger, & Bursell, 1998). This view is also supported by indications of
spontaneous planning during mind-wandering (Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011;
Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2011a)—presumably
planning for action toward one of the participant’s goals. Studies of thoughts
retrospectively recalled as thoughts about “today and yesterday” were also characterized,
in comparison with things less thought about, as being about goals marked by stronger
commitment or by obstacles to their attainment (Klinger, Barta, & Maxeiner, 1980).
Spontaneous thoughts are probably triggered by cues (meaningful stimuli) that may be
external in the environment or internal in the person’s own mental activity and that are
associated with one or another of the individual’s goals. Such cues may take many forms,
such as the name of a loved one or something associated in the person’s mind with a
loved one (or with an enemy, etc.), or a word, image, or smell associated with an ongoing
goal pursuit, including cues related to failure to achieve a goal (Chatard & Selimbegović,
2011, Study 6).
A growing literature indicates that becoming committed to pursuing a goal boosts the
cognitive-processing priority for cues related to that goal. Thus, knowing a person’s goals
is a good predictor of which cues (such as spoken words) the person will attend to, recall,
and have thoughts or dreams about—namely, those that are associated with the person’s
own goals, as compared with someone else’s goals (Hoelscher, Klinger, & Barta, 1981;
Klinger, 1978, 2009, 2013; Nikles et al., 1998). (The parallels in findings with thoughts
and dreams become less surprising in light of the argument that dreams are partly akin
to mind-wandering in regard to both content and neural substrates; Domhoff & Fox,
2015.)
The processing priority may also be found in interference effects. For example, in the
classic Stroop procedure, in which participants are under instructions to name as quickly
as possible the color of the font of words displayed one at a time, participants typically
respond more slowly when the meaning of the word conflicts with the color, such as
green font for the word red. Presumably, word meaning takes precedence in cognitive
processing over font color. Similarly, reaction times (RTs) in reporting the font color of
goal-related words are typically on average longer than they are to non-goal-related
words (Johnsen Laberg, Cox, Vaksdal, & Hugdahl, 1994; Riemann & McNally, 1995;
Gilboa-Schechtman, Revelle, & Gotlib, 2000; Fadardi & Cox, 2008) or images.
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Presumably, the own-goal-relatedness of the (p. 217) word’s meaning grabs processing
priority over identification of font color, thereby slowing reporting of font color. This
processing priority could readily account for the tendency of conscious mental content in
mind-wandering to gravitate toward material related to the individual’s own goals. The
stimuli for shifts in the content of mind-wandering segments are presumably internal
ones in the individual’s own ongoing stream of thought.
Interestingly, a recent study provided evidence for the notion that attention allocation is
strongly influenced at early stages by the goal-relatedness of information (Vogt, Lozo,
Koster, & De Houwer, 2011). In this study, individuals either received a disgust or a
neutral induction. As expected, it was shown that a disgust induction elicited attention
toward disgust-related pictures that were briefly presented. More important, individuals
in the disgust induction condition also showed heightened attention for pictures
representing cleanliness, which is due to disgust triggering the goal to be clean and
attention thus being allocated to the means (e.g., cleaning products) of becoming clean.
It is, of course, hard to control particular segments of participants’ thought stream
experimentally so as to examine their role as internal cues to further thoughts. The
evidence described in the preceding showed that subtle own-goal-related external stimuli
strongly affected the content of thoughts and dreams, but those cues were external.
However, in a different kind of interference method, Kopp, D’Mello, and Mills (2015)
instructed some participants to list the features of an automobile and other participants
to list their to-do plans for the next five days. Subsequently, all read a scientific text and
indicated whenever they became aware of their mind wandering to task-unrelated
thoughts (TUTs) or to task-related interference (TRIs). As predicted, the participants who
had just reminded themselves of their short-term goals reported more TUTs and
displayed less comprehension of the text than did the control group, whereas the groups
did not differ in TRIs. The difference in TUTs mediated the difference in comprehension.
Presumably, recounting one’s own goals triggered more subsequent distracting thoughts,
probably also about one’s own goals. Other research (McVay & Kane, 2013) has also
shown with thought probes that displaying word triplets that contain words alluding to
participants’ personal concerns, as compared with other word triplets, increased
subsequent mind-wandering.
Mind-wandering is, of course, by definition thought that wanders off-task. However,
Dijksterhuis and his colleagues (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006; Dijksterhuis &
Nordgren, 2006) have proposed that “unconscious thought,” defined as “thought or
deliberation in the absence of conscious attention directed at the problem” at hand
(Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006, p. 1005), provides important
contributions to goal attainment, such as superior decision-making. Their investigations
have provided evidence in support of this position (but see Nieuwenstein et al., 2015).
However, this evidence is based on a procedure that, typically and tacitly, operationalizes
unconscious thought as whatever mental processing occurs during a task designed to
distract the participant from a previous assignment that is to be resumed after an
intervening distractor task. This seems very similar to the operational definition
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commonly used for opportunities for mind-wandering, except that the distracting tasks
assigned by Dijksterhuis’s group, such as the n-back task (i.e., pressing a space bar when
the character on a screen is the same as one n trials ago), are intended to block all
conscious thought. What we now know about mind-wandering makes it likely that this
procedure reduces but does not completely block it. It remains an open question as to the
extent or way that “unconscious thought” and mind-wandering are in fact different
processes. Perhaps future brain-imaging research can address this question.
The reason for raising this point here is that one investigation (Bos, Dijksterhuis, & van
Baaren, 2008) finds clearly that, in the absence of an experimentally induced goal to
complete a task later, the contribution of unconscious thought to that task disappears.
This supports the view that continuing the processing of task-relevant information
depends on having established the current concern that underlies a goal pursuit.
Relatedly, a review of other evidence indicates that “goal completion dissolves the
cognitive, affective, and behavioural effects of goal striving” (Oettingen, 2012, p. 34),
indicating that successful goal pursuit ends the cognitive effects of the respective current
concern.

Duration and Frequency of Spontaneous Thought Segments
Thought segments are on average very brief. A group of 20 participants, who had
received practice with feedback at estimating brief time lapses, rated the durations of
their latest thought segments prior to probes, and of the segments just preceding those,
in both laboratory settings and, for 12 of them, while living their otherwise normal daily
(p. 218) lives. A segment here was defined as a thought that is thematically homogeneous
and ends when the topic shifts. These participants’ median estimates of segment duration
were 5 seconds in both laboratory and daily-life settings, with a mean of 9 seconds in the
laboratory setting and 14 seconds (with a standard deviation of 22 seconds) outside the
laboratory (Klinger, 1978). These participants rated their confidence in their own
estimates as “very confident” 64% of the time and as “moderately confident” 35% of the
time. Pope (1977) asked participants in a laboratory to signal with a key press every time
their mind shifted to a new topic, which happened on average about 5 to 6 seconds apart.
This agrees very approximately with the findings described in the preceding (Klinger,
1978).
These estimated durations applied to all of a participant’s sampled thoughts, not just the
spontaneous ones, but participants in Klinger’s (1978) sample also rated each thought on
a variety of variables, including Directedness and Undirectedness, the latter being
equivalent to spontaneity. The correlations of Undirectedness ratings with Duration for
daily-life samples were –.18 for the latest thought segment and –.08 for the just-previous
thought segment; the corresponding correlations for Directedness were .17 and .11. The
corresponding correlations for Undirectedness in laboratory samples were –.05 and .00;
for Directedness, they were .06 and .02. Clearly, these are all very small correlations. It

Page 5 of 33

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use.
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 14 April 2018

Spontaneous Thought and Goal Pursuit: From Functions Such as Planning
to Dysfunctions Such as Rumination
therefore seems safe to consider spontaneous thoughts, which make up between about a
third and a half of people’s thought segments, to be of approximately the same duration
as directed thoughts.
The implication is that mental content continually jumps from one goal-related topic to
another in brief segments that may or may not reflect the same goal. A very rough
estimate provides the generalization that waking mental activity over a 16-hour day
contains about 4,000 such thought segments (Klinger, 1990), of which perhaps between
about 1,300 to 2,000 are spontaneous.

Emotional Responses in Relation to Spontaneous Thoughts
There are a number of reasons to believe that thoughts carry emotional charge and may,
in fact, be triggered by at least low-amplitude, fragmentary emotional responses (protoemotional responses; Klinger, 1996). First, there are substantial intra-individual
correlations, across words, between the strength of participants’ self-rated emotional
response to each word and the extent to which they rated each word as related to their
“important concerns, problems, worries, or goals that currently preoccupy” them. These
correlations range from .45 (Bock & Klinger, 1986) to a set of correlations that ranged
from 0.57 to 0.65 in four unpublished data sets.
Second, goal-relatedness of thoughts is associated with emotional arousal. For example,
another investigation (Nikula, Klinger, & Larson-Gutman, 1993) prompted participants for
their thought content when experimenters observed unsolicited skin-conductance
responses, which are often taken to indicate emotional response. Ratings for the goalrelatedness of thoughts were at those times significantly higher than when participants’
thoughts were sampled during electodermally quiescent periods. Using a different
approach, inducing an affectively negative concern experimentally led to increased mindwandering and, subsequent to the mind-wandering episodes, continuing negative affect,
suggesting that the mental content of the mind-wandering contributed to maintaining the
negative affect (Stawarczyk, Majerus, & D’Argembeau, 2013; see also Watkins, Grafton,
Weinstein, & MacLeod, 2015, in regard to “emotional extrapolation”).
Also, in a lexical-decision task (pressing a button as quickly as possible to indicate
whether a letter on a screen was an X or a Y; Schneider, 1987), one side of the screen
contained words intended to be peripheral distracting stimuli and probably not
consciously perceived. The emotional-arousal effect of the distractor words (as
subsequently rated by the participants) was inversely correlated with reaction time to the
letters being judged as X or Y; that is, words that participants rated as emotionally
arousing slowed their task response—gained higher cognitive processing priority over the
assigned lexical decision-making—in a way similar to that found with goal-related words
in the Stroop. That this really was an effect of emotion is supported by the finding that
the interference with task responses was associated with participants’ scores on the
Affective Intensity Measure (Larsen & Diener, 1987). Given the preceding evidence that
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goal-related thoughts accompany emotional arousal and that mind-wandering mostly
features goal-related thoughts, it is of interest that mind-wandering is itself associated
with pupillary dilation, often viewed as indicative of emotional arousal (Franklin,
Broadway, Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2013).
This similarity between emotional arousal and goal-relatedness in the effects of distractor
words on cognitive processing is consistent with the view (p. 219) that “being goalrelated” means “being emotionally arousing.” It presumably follows that the emotional
tenor of mind-wandering is to some extent determined by the affective quality of the
emotional response to cues, which accompanies or perhaps evokes the next segments of
thought flow. Glowing recollections of a good time at a party, of recognition for an
accomplishment, or of a loving social interaction would expectedly carry a strongly
positive emotional charge. Recollections of personal rejection or failure—threats to or
loss of important goal attainments—would expectedly carry a strongly negative emotional
charge. Furthermore, mood at one time point is associated with the affective tone of
subsequent thoughts (Poerio, Totterdell, & Miles, 2013). Correspondingly, emotionally
charged thought segments are likely to lead to further segments of similar affective
quality, whether anticipation of future positive consequences in the case of a foregoing
positive segment, or, in the case of foregoing negative segments, subsequent segments of
self-examination, self-criticism, anger at others with anticipation of future avoidance of
them or revenge, and imagined future episodes of rejection, failure, or loss. With strong
emotional charge, as when important goals are involved, the resulting thought stream
may be funneled into loops of thematically and emotionally related or event-repetitive
content, as in rumination (rumination is discussed at greater length in a later section).

Adaptiveness of Spontaneous Thoughts
The preceding view on spontaneous thoughts suggests both adaptive and maladaptive
consequences. That spontaneous thoughts must have significant adaptive benefits is a
clear logical inference from the apparent fact that humans have evolved to spend up to
half of their mental activity engaging in them.
The notion that such an ubiquitous process must have significant adaptive advantages for
the human species has received recognition (Baars, 2010; Klinger, 1990; Smallwood &
Andrews-Hanna, 2013), but so far only limited research attention, although that is
gradually changing, including integration with advancing neuroscientific findings
(Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Andrews‐Hanna, Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014; Fox, Spreng,
Ellamil, Andrews-Hanna, & Christoff, 2015; Gruberger Ben-Simon, Levkovitz, Zangen, &
Hendler, 2011). From a purely inductive standpoint, based on informal observation of the
contents of spontaneous thoughts, a number of possible benefits are already apparent.
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Keeping Track of Goals
First, given the brevity of most mind-wandering segments and the large number of them
during a particular day, and given the tendency for these segments to cycle through
thematic material relevant to an individual’s numerous current goals, it is apparent that
mind-wandering serves the function of reviewing an individual’s agenda of goals other
than the goal being currently pursued. This must surely refresh memory of these other
goals and, most likely, serve as a reminder mechanism for taking timely action.

Promoting Planning
Second, given that a substantial portion of mind-wandering or daydream segments are
future-oriented (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Baird et al., 2011; Buckner, Andrews-Hanna,
& Schacter, 2008; Klinger & Cox, 1987–1988; Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 2009;
Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 2011), they provide an arena for spontaneous planning or
contributions to planning. Indeed, there is now evidence for such a planning function. On
the one hand, these spontaneous contributions are in most instances imaginary fragments
that bear on goals and plans without providing a linear planning process (Schacter,
2012). On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that mind-wandering cannot
wander onto and perhaps be interrupted by brief operant (i.e., instrumental) segments.
Researchers discovered that mind-wandering often includes an interweaving of defaultnetwork activity with executive brain systems (Christoff, 2012; Christoff, Ream, &
Gabrieli, 2004; Christoff et al., 2009; Mason et al., 2007; Spreng et al., 2010). One would
expect such a process to contribute to the formulation of concrete plans for future
behavior, as found by Baird et al. (2011) and Stawarczyk et al. (2011a). For example,
spontaneous imagery of an upcoming party might portray an awkward interaction with an
individual who is expected to be present, which might stimulate some operant thoughts of
how to handle that situation. Spreng et al. (2010), based on fMRI observations, proposed
a three-network model of how this switching process happens. The three networks are
the default-mode network, the dorsal attention network, and a frontoparietal control
network. The first two have “an intrinsic competitive relationship” (Spreng et al., 2010, p.
303), (p. 220) whereas the third plays a key role in the switch back and forth.

Creative Problem-Solving
It has long been recognized in popular culture that difficult problems requiring nonroutine and hence creative solutions can benefit from merely allowing time to pass before
trying to finalize them, as in the advice to “sleep on” the problem. It is likely that not only
sleep, but also periods of spontaneous mentation, such as mind-wandering, facilitate this
kind of incubation. There are numerous anecdotal accounts of people having important
insights into difficult problems during carriage rides, bathing, taking a walk or a nap, and
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so on—that is, activities conducive to spontaneous mentation (e.g., Klinger, 1990; Singer,
2009). Now there are also relevant controlled experiments.
Dijksterhuis and Meurs (2009), investigating the efficacy of “unconscious
thought” (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006), assigned participants to tasks such as finding
creative names for pastas or unusual uses for a brick and placed them in one of three
conditions: immediate responses, or responses following three-minute periods of either
focused thought about the problem or a distractor task. In three experiments, the
participants responded with more creative or divergent responses after the distractor
task than after the other activities. The investigators hoped to design distractor tasks that
would suppress conscious thought, but from what we know about mind-wandering—very
brief segments, focused on unmet goals—it seems unlikely that the suppression could
have been complete (Singer, 1966). It is therefore likely but uncertain that spontaneous
thoughts could have been responsible for the results.
However, Baird et al. (2012) provided participants with two opportunities to think of
unusual uses for common objects. Between these opportunities, some participants
engaged in a very undemanding task that would provide plenty of time for spontaneous
thoughts, and others received a very demanding task that would limit spontaneous
mentation. The group who had the undemanding interim task performed significantly
better than the other group on the second opportunity to come up with creative solutions.
Evidently the chance to engage in spontaneous thought, as in mind-wandering, fostered
the necessary incubation of creative solutions in a way that improved performance.

Reviewing Past Experiences
Of course, coming up with new ideas often involves drawing on one’s past experiences.
Also, there is pleasure to be savored when reliving one’s past good times and successes,
perhaps in relation to hopes for more of them. Furthermore, when faced with one’s own
limitations and failures, transcending these often thrusts one into scrutinizing what one
might have done differently, sometimes leading to useful insights that improve
performance later on. Indeed, the contents of spontaneous thoughts and dreams include a
substantial portion of memories and reflections on past events (Andrews-Hanna et al.,
2010; Klinger & Cox, 1987–1988), especially during negative moods (Smallwood et al.,
2011; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). Reviewing past experiences for benefits to future
endeavors is presumably advantageous in reaching one’s goals.

Reduced Delay Discounting
Delay discounting is the phenomenon in which people, given the choice, prefer to receive
smaller rewards soon rather than larger rewards later; that is, they presumably discount
the value to them of the reward the more remote it will be in time. This preference may
keep a person from maximizing well-being by settling for less than is available, be it
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money, career satisfaction, or a solid personal relationship. There is evidence that people
whose minds wander more than others display less delay discounting (Smallwood, Ruby,
& Singer, 2013), presumably therefore displaying more patience and arriving at more
prudent choices. Unfortunately, because this evidence is correlational rather than
experimental, one cannot be sure regarding the direction of causality.

Consolidation of Memories
There is ample evidence that sleep helps to consolidate long-term memories (e.g., PaceSchott, Germain, & Milad, 2015), especially during rapid-eye-movement (REM) sleep
(McDevitt, Duggan, & Mednick, 2014) and especially with regard to goal-relevant
features (Bennion, Payne, & Kensinger, 2015). It now appears that periods of spontaneous
thinking confer a similar, albeit weaker, consolidation benefit. In an extensive review of
relevant literature, Christoff, Gordon, and Smith (2011) concluded that “recent findings
suggest that the off-line processing that occurs during periods of rest is associated with
the kind of memory consolidation processes that occur during sleep” (p. 264).

Superiority in Shifting Between Internal Thought Flow and
External Stimuli
(p. 221)

There are individual differences in control over the direction of attention between
internal and external processes. The ability to shift back and forth appears positively
related to the individual’s working memory capacity (Rummel & Boywitt, 2014).
Additionally, trait measures of mind-wandering appear inversely related to the size of
attentional blinks (Thomson, Ralph, Besner, & Smilek, 2015); that is, when individuals are
presented with a pair of stimuli in rapid enough succession, they do not register the
second of those stimuli. The maximum inter-stimulus interval for this to happen is the size
of an individual’s attentional blink. In the study by Thomson et al. (2015), high scores on
trait mind-wandering predicted shorter blinks, meaning that people whose minds wander
more can on average shift more rapidly than others to the second stimulus in such a pair.
Thomson et al. suggest that this is an indication of adaptively finer control over the focus
of attention.

Facilitating Action Toward Goal-Attainment
Setting goals and moving on them generally begin with mental processes, often
spontaneous, that recognize the desirability of an outcome, its attainability, and the
means necessary for attaining it. It is, of course, difficult in observational research to
disentangle these processes for purposes of establishing what leads to what. The closest
that investigators have come so far is by instructing human participants to initiate
daydream-like experiences and to vary something about the nature of these experiences,
such as what the person might look forward to enjoying as a result of goal attainment or
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the obstacles that the person might imagine having to overcome (e.g., Oettingen, Pak, &
Schnetter, 2001). These imaginal segments are clearly not completely spontaneous in
regard to their initiation and certain features of content, but once initiated and broadly
determined by the investigator, they then unfold in perhaps partly spontaneous fashion.
Experimental evidence indicates that induced daydreaming of this kind can influence
subsequent real-life goal attainment. Oettingen et al. (2001) have in a number of studies
established that optimal goal-attainment “requires explicit, simultaneous mental
elaborations of both the desired future and present reality as instigated in the mental
contrasting procedure” (p. 748), as for example reaching health-promoting goals
(Johannessen, Oettingen, & Mayer, 2012), exercise goals (Sheeran et al., 2013), and a
variety of goals in a depressed sample (Fritzsche et al., 2016). Dwelling only on the
pleasures of attainment or only on the obstacles in its way tended to be
counterproductive in leading participants to reach their goals (e.g., Oettingen, 1996), as,
for instance, in their teachers’ ratings of actual achievement (Oettingen et al., 2001).
Other studies of thoughts initiated by experimental instructions but allowed to unfold
spontaneously have also found effects on intentions or actions likely to advance particular
goal pursuits (e.g., Gollwitzer, 1990; Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Ratajczak, 1990; Nenkov
& Gollwitzer, 2012). Whether these findings with only partially spontaneous thoughts will
transfer to the effects of fully spontaneous thoughts remains to be demonstrated. (For a
summary of research related to mental contrasting and prospective thinking, see
Oettingen, 2012).

Costs of Spontaneous Thoughts
Research on the consequences of mind-wandering has focused heavily on its costs in the
form of attentional lapses and degraded performance. However, it is important to keep in
mind that neuroscientists became interested in mind-wandering and the default mode
network as their participants switched from working on tasks to more relaxed intervals
between tasks (Raichle et al., 2001). Mind-wandering occurs most often when the brain is
less than fully occupied with tasks (such as during rest or undemanding tasks) or the
external environment (e.g., Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010), when it is often safe to decouple
brain activity (Smallwood, Tipper, et al., 2013) briefly from the external environment and
ongoing tasks.
Because of this timing, there may be only modest impacts of mind-wandering on
performance, but in other cases the impact can be substantial. Mooneyham and Schooler
(2013) have presented an extensive review of empirical work on these costs, which
include impaired comprehension when reading, impaired sustained attention to tasks,
poorer performance on measures of working memory and general aptitude, and, on
average, lowered mood. Since the publication of this review, Mrazek, Phillips, Franklin,
Broadway, and Schooler (2013) have similarly reported impaired reading comprehension
associated with prompt-assessed mind-wandering. A number of further studies have
Page 11 of 33

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use.
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 14 April 2018

Spontaneous Thought and Goal Pursuit: From Functions Such as Planning
to Dysfunctions Such as Rumination
found additional costs: attentional lapses associated with impaired performance on the
Stroop (p. 222) task (Unsworth & McMillan, 2014), a significant relationship between
mind-wandering proclivity and frequency of falls in older adults, presumably at least
partly because of inattention to external stimuli (Nagamatsu, Kam, Liu-Ambrose, Chan, &
Handy, 2013), particularly in the left visual field (Kam, Nagamatsu, & Handy, 2014), and
reduced empathic responses to others’ physical discomfort, as assessed by participants’
ratings and electrophysiologically with event-related potentials (Kam, Xu, & Handy,
2014). By contrast, when leaving aside its perseverative, ruminative forms, mindwandering appears unrelated to most measures of health (Ottaviani & Couyoumdjian,
2013; Ottaviani, Shapiro, & Couyoumdjian, 2013).
Nevertheless, the cognitive impairment found in these studies must be qualified by other
findings that even during mind-wandering, people retain some sensitivity to external cues
when these relate to potentially important matters or when a stimulus is unexpected
(Kam et al., 2013). This conclusion is consistent with sleeping or otherwise occupied
participants’ disproportionate response to and incorporation of unexpected cues related
to their goal pursuits (Hoelscher, Klinger, & Barta, 1981; Klinger, 1978). Furthermore, the
interference of mind-wandering with task activity appears to affect especially response
inhibition and working memory, but not set-shifting (assessed in this case by delays
caused after shifts in task rules within a series of trials; Kam & Handy, 2014). The costs of
mind-wandering to task performance are therefore apparently different for different
aspects of performance and different kinds of external cues, the brain seemingly
weighing the relative importance of external information versus maintaining the ongoing
stream of thought (Handy & Kam, 2015).

Spontaneous Thoughts and Mood
The findings for the cognitive costs of mind-wandering are easily understandable.
Perceptual decoupling is bound to interfere to some extent with absorbing one’s reading
material and to distract from other ongoing tasks, including, of course, those that are
measures of a person’s cognitive capacity. Mooneyham and Schooler’s (2013)
generalization regarding lowered mood, however, must be treated with caution.
The generalization that mind-wandering lowers mood was misleadingly emphasized in the
title and summary statements of an otherwise important article by Killingsworth and
Gilbert (2010), an experience-sampling study with a huge sample. Close inspection of
their data fails to support the generalization that mind-wandering as such lowers mood,
only that the thematic content of mind-wandering segments influences mood. Inasmuch
as minds wander to concerns about one’s own goal pursuits, especially those that are still
incomplete and those that may be in trouble (Klinger, Barta, & Maxeiner, 1980), one
might expect lower, more serious moods on average. However, in Killingsworth and
Gilbert’s own data, participants rated 42.5% of their mind-wandering episodes as about
something “pleasant,” with mood then averaging slightly above the overall mood average,
roughly equaling mood when not mind-wandering. They rated 31% of the remaining
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mind-wandering episodes as about something “neutral,” with average mood slightly
below overall average but above the mood scale’s midpoint. Participants rated mood as
sharply below overall average and below the scale midpoint only during the 26.5% of
mind-wandering samples that they characterized as about something “unpleasant.” Thus,
only particular thought content, not mind-wandering as such, was associated with
substantially lowered mood (cf. also Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013; Stawarczyk,
Majerus, Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2012). This was also the conclusion reached in
subsequent experience-sampling studies (Marchetti, Koster, & de Raedt, 2013; Poerio,
Totterdell, & Miles, 2013; see also, Fox, Thompson, Andrews-Hanna, & Christoff, 2014).

Maladaptive and Excessive Daydreaming
There has recently been an upsurge of interest in a condition in which people spend large
amounts of time in imaginative daydreaming, usually involving imaginary companions or
casts of characters that recur over time, sometimes as long as years, which gains a kind
of quasi-reality (Bigelsen & Schupak, 2011; Schupak & Rosenthal, 2009). Interestingly, an
early case report was documented by Féré in his La Pathologie des émotions (1892/1899).
M. M. was a 37-year-old commercial man, married and with children, who suffered from
long periods of absent-mindedness. During these zone-outs, he was somewhat insulated
from the surrounding environment or carried on his daily duties in a rather unconscious
and mechanical way. Nevertheless, his daydreams were very structured and coherent,
given that in his imaginary life “M. M. had constructed at Chaville on the borders of the
wood, a pavilion surrounded by a garden. By successive additions the pavilion became a
chateau, the garden a park; stables horses (p. 223) and pieces of water were introduced
to ornament the domain. [ . . . ] A woman arrived to animate this scene: two children were
born, it only remained to make this ideal ménage legitimate. This was the only drawback
to the happiness of our dreamer” (Féré, 1892/1899, p. 316). Although this is an anecdotal
report and does not represent the virtually unlimited variety of people’s daydreams, the
generation of vivid and emotionally salient, imaginary second lives recurs in recent
reports of excessive daydreaming as well (Bigelsen & Schupak, 2011).
Importantly, recent accounts show that excessive daydreamers are fully aware that the
persons depicted in their daydreams are fictional—there is no question here of delusion
or other psychotic phenomena—and the range of the daydreamers’ ability to function in
real life may range from excellent to seriously impaired. These daydreamers appear to
develop an attachment to their daydream sequences that makes it hard to abandon them.
Attempts to suppress them may lead to a yearning, even grief over their loss. These
daydreamers are variably accepting or distressed by their habitual daydreaming,
especially if they perceive that the daydreams interfere with fully actualizing their
potential in real-life goal attainment.
It is unclear to what extent unusual amounts of habitual fanciful daydreaming can be
considered a particular psychological disorder. Certainly if it distresses or significantly
handicaps the daydreamer and the daydreamer feels incapable of controlling it, it can at
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least be considered a condition that merits clinical intervention. However, its
manifestations vary enough across daydreamers that there is no clear single
psychopathology with which it can be classified. In some ways it qualifies as obsessive
thought, but it seems distinct from that diagnosis in that, whereas its existence in this
quantity distresses the daydreamer, the experience of it while it happens feels positively
satisfying, and suppressing it leads to grief—a sense of loss of the daydreamed pseudoreality—rather than to anxiety. It has addictive properties, but at this point there appears
to be no research that establishes these. Addiction is a matter of warped decision-making,
warped choices. In the case of addiction to substances such as alcohol, there are physical
changes that skew decisions by overweighting the subjective value of the substance. It is
unclear that daydreaming can instill the same changes. However, it is known that
imagining perceptions or actions engages much of the brain’s systems that would be
engaged by actual perceptions and actions (Kosslyn, Thompson, & Alpert, 1997). Perhaps
longer-term imagining of fictional individuals can foster emotional attachments in the
same way that extended personal contacts can foster emotional attachments to actual
others. Terminating the fictional relationship may then yield a goal-disengagement
process (Klinger, 1975, 1977; Klinger & Cox, 2011a) somewhat similar to that produced
by the loss of a valued real other person.

Rumination
Rumination is a form of repetitive self-focus that leads to and exacerbates depressive
symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001).
Rumination has been conceptualized in various ways, emphasizing either the trait or the
context-dependent nature of rumination (Smith & Alloy, 2009). Moreover, various theories
have provided different proposals on the main triggering events of rumination, which
include negative mood as well as goal non-attainment (Smith & Alloy, 2009).

The Current Concerns Approach to Rumination
The goal theory of current concerns described earlier (e.g., Klinger, 1977, 2013; Klinger &
Cox, 2011a) is helpful in explaining many of the key features of rumination; that is, goalrelated cues, presumably including those in one’s own thought stream, carry varying
degrees and kinds of emotional charge and receive processing priority. Thoughts with
strongly emotional content would have a high likelihood of evoking associated subsequent
thoughts. These are also likely to carry a similar valence of emotional charge (positive or
negative). This process is apparent in, for example, people happily in love, where affect is
predominantly positive, but also in people grieving over a rejection, loss, or significant
failure, especially while they are disengaging from their seemingly doomed goal (Klinger,
1975, 1977; Klinger & Cox, 2011a), when affect is predominantly negative. The focused
nature of the resulting streams of thought is precisely what we observe in rumination.
Given the role of emotional response in this process, one would predict that individuals
high in trait affectivity would be especially prone to fall into ruminative states. The
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frequently demonstrated high correlation between trait rumination and measures of
negative affect supports this prediction (e.g., Watkins et al., 2015).
In support of the idea of narrowed cognitive processing of goal- and emotion-related cues,
Grol, (p. 224) Hertel, Koster, and De Raedt (2015) instructed participants to imagine an
emotionally wrenching scenario (having just run over people with one’s car) and then
either dwell on their negative feelings about it, or engage in problem-solving thinking. In
a visuo-spatial task where participants needed to process self- versus non-self-related
stimuli and detect targets in the periphery, participants high in trait rumination showed
attentional narrowing toward personally relevant stimuli, with reduced retention of
personally irrelevant peripheral stimuli. Given the close relationship between trait
rumination and negative affectivity, it would appear that the strong negative emotions
provoked by the ruminative instructions to focus on an emotionally devastating scenario
led to thoughts responding repeatedly to ongoing emotionally charged stimuli, both
internal (ideation) and external (self-referential experimental stimuli), thereby
maintaining the narrow focus of rumination. This notion of difficulties in controlling
attentional-processing priorities can be related to a large body of research on information
processing and rumination, to which we now turn.

Individual Differences and Impaired Attentional Disengagement That
Moderate Cognitive and Emotional Mechanisms in Rumination
Nothing in the current concerns approach excludes other factors from operating in
rumination, such as individual differences in attentional focus, inhibitory ability, or
properties of working memory and executive control functions (e.g., Whitmer & Gotlib,
2013). On the one hand, current concerns theory describes mechanisms that govern the
flow of spontaneous thoughts in general and indicates how these can operate to produce
ruminative thought. Individual differences enter only insofar as different individuals are
committed to different sets of goals and vary in the properties and strength of their
emotional reactions. However, this formulation can be mapped onto theories that
emphasize the cognitive processes related to rumination and that focus on the way in
which certain emotionally salient thoughts receive cognitive processing priority. These
theories are interesting to explain the persistence of rumination, despite efforts to control
this process.
Key mechanisms for the cycling in rumination within a narrow content field have been
proposed in a number of theories. Many of these theories emphasize individual
differences in cognitive processing styles. For instance, attentional focus theory (Whitmer
& Gotlib, 2013) provides a variable of individual differences in the degree to which
individuals constrict their attention and thought content to particular cognitive themes
after they are started. This constriction is enhanced in negative mood states and is
weakened during positive moods. An individual’s typical degree of constriction would
moderate the likelihood that a negatively toned ruminative stream, once started, will
continue.
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Individual differences in emotional extrapolation, posited by Watkins, Grafton, Weinstein,
and MacLeod (2015), refers to the likelihood that an initial mood state associated with
some event, presumably including a thought segment, will persist to color expectancies
for subsequent events. Current concerns theory also posits some degree of such
emotional continuity, in that the thematic content of an emotionally potent, goal-related
thought segment is predicted to lead by association to thematically and emotionally
related (but not identical) subsequent thought segments. This hypothesized continuity is
confirmed by findings of negative affect being maintained across mind-wandering
segments (Stawarczyk, Majerus, & D’Argembeau, 2013). Watkins et al. (2015), moreover,
theorize that the extent of such continuity constitutes a kind of individual trait. People
high in emotional extrapolation would experience amplified emotional continuity. When
the emotion is predominantly negative, as in trait negative affectivity (Tellegen et al.,
1988), the trait would dispose toward greater likelihood of rumination.
The impaired disengagement factor posited by Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, and De
Raedt (2011) as a prominent route toward depression refers to impaired control of
attention that weakens the individual’s ability to switch from a stream of negative
repetitive thoughts to something more constructive that might help to dispel the negative
mood. Importantly for this formulation, Koster et al. (2011) propose that, with sufficient
repetition and progressive impairment of attentional control, the resulting rumination
becomes habitual, further hindering its interruption and redirection. This approach is,
then, not primarily an individual-differences approach, but suggests a pathogenic
extension of the thought-flow processes described earlier.
Thus, these important approaches identify different possible mechanisms responsible for
individual differences in susceptibility to rumination by moderating the processes posited
by current concerns theory, whose model assumes that, with a powerful enough
emotional tone, any goal pursuit (or (p. 225) failed pursuit) can become the subject of
repetitive thought by any individual. Such repetitive thought is tantamount to rumination,
or may be so in the presence of certain additional qualities, depending on the definition of
rumination.
Interesting empirical support for information-processing theories of rumination comes
from studies that attempt to experimentally improve attentional or cognitive control
where rumination and depressive symptoms are studied as outcome variables. For
instance, in a recent study where individuals with heightened levels of rumination were
allocated to either a cognitive control training versus an active control condition, it was
observed that individuals undergoing cognitive control training for two weeks showed
lower emotional reactivity to a lab stressor as well as lowered levels of depressogenic
rumination during a subsequent exam period (Hoorelbeke, Koster, Vanderhasselt,
Callewaert, & Demeyer, 2015).

Response Styles and Control Theories of Rumination

Page 16 of 33

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use.
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 14 April 2018

Spontaneous Thought and Goal Pursuit: From Functions Such as Planning
to Dysfunctions Such as Rumination
The most influential theory of rumination is currently still the response styles theory
(RST), which defines rumination as “behaviors and thoughts that focus one’s attention on
one’s depressive symptoms and on the implications of those symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema
1991, p. 569). According to this theory, individuals react to negative mood by initiating
ruminative processing with the aim of enhancing their self-understanding, which
unfortunately leads to a paradoxical increase in negative mood (Lyubomirsky & NolenHoeksema, 1995). Within the RST, two specific ruminative subtypes have been defined
and are worth mentioning: reflective pondering and depressive brooding (Treynor,
Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). Reflective pondering is considered the less
maladaptive form of rumination, as it reflects the extent to which individuals try to
improve their mood by engaging in problem-focused thinking. Brooding is considered the
more detrimental form of rumination, as it represents “a passive comparison of one’s
current situation with some unachieved standard” (Treynor et al., 2003, p. 256).
Importantly, Martin and Tesser, consistent with earlier current-concerns theory and
evidence regarding depression (Klinger, 1975, 1977; Klinger, Barta, & Maxeiner, 1980),
proposed a control theory account of rumination. This theory proposes that, as in the
earlier current-concerns account of depression, state rumination is initiated by, and
focuses on, a perceived discrepancy between one’s goals and one’s current state and
continues until the goal is either attained or abandoned (Martin & Tesser, 1989, 1996).
Compared with RST, this account is focused less on depressed mood but can be applied
more broadly to a wide range of circumstances. Interestingly, it has been found that cuing
unresolved personal goals indeed was associated with an increased number of negative
ruminative thought intrusions during a sustained attention-to-response task, compared
with cuing a resolved personal goal (Roberts, Watkins, & Wills, 2013).
In an attempt to link the RST and the control theory of rumination, Watkins and NolenHoeksema (2014) proposed that rumination can be conceptualized as a mental habit
(Hertel, 2004) that starts with episodes of self-focused repetitive thought, triggered by
goal discrepancies, which become habitual through an automatic associative process
between repetitive thinking and its context (e.g., physical location, mood). When, over
time, these contexts trigger a passive focus on negative content combined with low levels
of concrete thinking (see Watkins, 2008), the habit of depressive rumination is acquired.
The latter type of habitual rumination is thought to be context-independent of goals and
resistant to change.
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Rumination and Spontaneous Thoughts
Given the relevance of goals and mental habits in spontaneous thoughts, one might
suspect a rather large overlap between ruminative thinking and daydreaming. However,
correlational studies clearly report only moderate correlations (Epel et al., 2013;
Marchetti, Van de Putte, & Koster, 2014). One explanation for this is that the term
daydreaming is often used to refer specifically to fanciful mental streams, whereas
rumination is generally serious and uncreative. In these senses, daydreaming and
rumination are by no means the same phenomenon, even though both can usually be
construed as instances of mind-wandering, and both are generally instances of
spontaneous thought. In a new integrative framework aiming to understand the link
between spontaneous thought and cognitive risk factors, Marchetti, Koster, Klinger, and
Alloy (2016) propose that spontaneous thought, defined most broadly, can act as a context
in which cognitive risk factors for depression such as rumination (but also thoughts of
hopelessness, negative self-esteem, and cognitive reactivity) can be readily expressed,
which is especially the case in conditions of heightened negative affectivity. In that sense,
rumination (p. 226) is a specific subtype of spontaneous thought characterized by
dominant negative thought content that is processed in an abstract and repetitive way so
as to lock the train of thoughts into a thematically narrow content channel (Klinger, 2013;
Watkins, 2008). Here it is important to note that this differs from many other instances in
which spontaneous thought unfolds in an open, expansive, and divergent way (Marchetti
et al., 2014; Watkins, 2010).
An interesting finding in this regard is empirical evidence showing that the affective
consequences of spontaneous thought are multifactorially determined, based on the
presence of individual-difference variables that heighten the susceptibility to engaging in
state rumination (Marchetti, Koster, & De Raedt, 2013). More specifically, rest-related
spontaneous thoughts seem capable of shaping transitory ruminative thoughts in
individuals showing, primarily, medium to high levels of trait cognitive reactivity and,
secondarily, significant trait levels of ruminative brooding.

Clinical Implications
Traditionally, clinical interventions have targeted only selective kinds of spontaneous
thought, such as maladaptive aspects of daydreaming and rumination, which show partial
overlap with spontaneous thought (Marchetti et al., 2016; Watkins, 2010). However,
examining the content and, perhaps, frequency of spontaneous thought in general could
have some interesting clinical implications that are worthy of further examination.

Spontaneous Thought as Ancillary Information About Motivational
Structure
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Broadly speaking and in keeping with a transdiagnostic approach, psychopathology is
often characterized and maintained by problematic goals architecture. This can take a
number of different forms. First, psychopathology, such as anxiety and depression, is
frequently characterized by strong avoidance-related goals (see Hayes, Wilson, Gifford,
Follette, & Strosahl, 1996), often based on negative experiences and avoiding danger,
rejection, or hurt. This has important consequences for the cognitive processing of
situations. For instance, for someone with social anxiety and the goal to avoid rejection by
others, a social situation may cue attention to social threat and the context-specific
means to reach safety (e.g., excuses to leave a gathering early), which can impair new
learning and maintain threat-related beliefs. Frequently, such avoidance-related goals
outweigh other more positively oriented goals so as to render individuals less likely to
process positive information and/or actively pursue desired outcomes.
Given the dependence of spontaneous thought content on an individual’s goals, these
processes can be predicted to determine the content of the individual’s thought flow.
Although cognitive therapies try to change clients’ beliefs and mental habits as a way to
change behavior, it is ultimately the client’s behavior and affect that the therapy tries to
influence. Insofar as spontaneous thought content is itself troublesome, these procedures
have some merit, but altering a client’s pattern of goal pursuits—the client’s motivational
structure—can also predictably contribute to changed cognitive processing and
spontaneous thought flow. Thus, one strategy for changing troublesome spontaneous
thought flow is to change the motivational structure—the individual’s set of goals—that
largely determines its content and frequency.
Psychopathology can also be rooted in negative life events where individuals see
important goals blocked (Klinger, 1975, 1977; Klinger et al., 1980). Here it is crucial for
individuals to be capable of disengaging from unattainable goals and to reorient and
engage with goals that are more attainable. For various reasons (e.g., perfectionism, high
standards, high valuation of the goal, lack of promising alternative goals, etc.) individuals
can experience problems with disengaging from desired but unattainable goals or
engaging with new goals. These states powerfully impact spontaneous thought content
and affect.
Based on our theoretical position that the content of spontaneous thought has important
links to each individual’s goals, this content (such as mind-wandering, which is pervasive
and often adaptive, but may sometimes be viewed as interfering and disruptive) can in
the therapeutic context be used in multiple ways, for instance as diagnostic information
to aid in obtaining a clear view of the client’s goal structure. The content of spontaneous
thought and, probably, night dreams can signify or help to clarify individuals’ motivational
and cognitive structure (Beck, 1971/2004; Klinger, 1971). There are validated measures
of goal structure in questionnaire form, such as the Motivational Structure Questionnaire
and Personal Concerns Inventory (Cox & Klinger, 2011a; Klinger, 1987; Klinger & Cox,
2011b), but these rely on clients’ memories and self-insights. Inferences from
examination of clients’ spontaneous thought content may add important information.
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Modifying Spontaneous Thought Content by Modifying
Motivational Structure
(p. 227)

Assessing motivational structure is important for treatment of a wide variety of
conditions, perhaps especially, but not exclusively, depression, addiction, alienation,
aimlessness, and goal conflicts. These may require interventions aiming to replace
maladaptive motivational structures with more adaptive ones. For instance, within the
Systematic Motivational Counseling framework, validated techniques have been
developed to identify maladaptive goals and then help clients disengage from them in
favor of more realistic and attainable goals (Cox & Klinger, 2011b). The efficacy of this
type of intervention that focuses on clients’ motivational structure, rather than solely on
cognitive and/or behavioral aspects, has recently been documented in alcoholic patients
(Cox, Fadardi, Hosier, & Pothos, 2015), miscellaneous substance abusers with traumatic
brain injuries (Cox et al., 2003), and group treatment in a general clinical population
(Fuhrmann, Schroer, & de Jong-Meyer, 2011).
The general plan of these interventions is first to assess motivational structure (the types
of goals chosen, the degree of commitment to and valuation of each, and expectancies of
success) and then to discuss the findings with regard to such matters as the
interrelationships among the goals, the degree to which the valuation is the client’s own
versus someone else’s whom the client is trying to satisfy, the reasonableness of the
expectancies, conflicts among the goals and possible resolution of them, shifting from
aversive to appetitive goal pursuits, disengagement from inappropriate or fruitless goals,
possible additional or alternative goals that fit the client’s own true values and might
provide greater satisfaction, and realistic steps that might render discouragingly difficult
goals attainable. The goal of these interventions is, of course, a more adaptive
motivational structure, which should brighten mood and help clients abandon destructive
behaviors such as substance abuse. In addition to the already cited studies supporting
this hypothesis, higher adaptive motivational structure has been found related to lower
alcohol consumption in people whose consumption has led to objective life difficulties,
such as in the workplace, family and other social relationships, the legal system, health,
and so on (Cox et al., 2002). In clients with low scores on adaptive motivational structure,
there was no correlation between difficulties incurred from drinking and amount
consumed. Although this result was correlational and hence does not permit a firm
conclusion about causality, it seems a reasonable inference that highly adaptive
motivational structure facilitates reducing injurious alcohol consumption. Although these
investigations did not assess spontaneous thought content, their interventions can be
predicted to have changed it as well.
As indicated earlier, goal commitments establish cognitive processing priorities that
direct attention to goal-related cues. This can become problematic for a variety of
conditions and has been investigated with substance abusers. In much of the world, for
example, grocery stores sell alcoholic beverages and often place these in locations that
are hard to overlook. Heavy imbibers report that these displays rivet their attention and,
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even if they are trying to reduce alcohol use, nevertheless make it harder not to buy.
Similarly, when faced with a series of words, the attention of heavy drinkers is drawn to
words associated with alcohol use (as to other important goals). One clinical intervention
has been designed to reduce this problem by retraining attention. Using Stroop-like
interventions, participants adopt the goal of attending to the font color instead of to the
semantic meaning of alcohol-related words, or to the color outlines around various
depicted bottles. The administrator provides feedback and encouragement. Results show
that a series of such training sessions reduces the processing priority of alcohol cues and
reduces the amount of alcohol subsequently consumed for up to a three-month follow-up
assessment (Cox et al., 2015; Fadardi & Cox, 2009). Although these investigations are still
in their early stages (Koster & Bernstein, 2015) and so far have not assessed spontaneous
thought, the effect on attentiveness—as one kind of cognitive processing—can be
predicted to have also affected thought content, among other clinical outcomes.

Training for Concrete Versus Abstract Thought for Facing Difficulties
and Mental Contrasting for Goal Attainment
Another topic, which has been raised in the context of rumination by Watkins, is that the
specificity of thought can be important in determining whether thinking has beneficial or
detrimental consequences. The work by Watkins (e.g., 2008, 2010) has shown that
abstract versus more concrete thought can be problematic in maintaining negative affect.
Often, sufficiently concrete cognitive processing is necessary to facilitate adaptive
thought and behavior (e.g., planning, problem-solving). Excessive levels of abstract
negative (and probably also positive) spontaneous thinking can undermine (p. 228)
concrete steps toward a goal. Similarly, although expectancy of ultimate success is
important for well-motivated behavior, fantasizing only about positive outcomes and
trouble-free goal-pursuit, rather than thinking about the concrete realities necessary for
success, reduces chances of energetic pursuit and of success (Oettingen, 2012). To
address these aspects, promising training interventions have been developed to
rebalance the proportion and occurrence of abstract versus concrete thought (Watkins et
al., 2012) and to tie aspirations to concrete processing of steps necessary to achieve them
(Oettingen, 2012), processes that at first almost certainly enlist mental activity beyond
that of purely spontaneous thought and the default mode network (Achtziger, Fehr,
Oettingen, Gollwitzer, & Rockstroh, 2009). Whether the habits of thought developed in
these trainings eventually become spontaneous remains to be established.

Conclusions
Spontaneous thought is a phenomenon that is of long-standing interest to researchers.
We have reviewed some of the research showing the clear adaptive as well as
maladaptive consequences of this phenomenon. Based on a goal perspective, it becomes
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clear why spontaneous thought is so pervasively present in mental life. Moreover, this
perspective also casts light on how spontaneous thought can become maladaptive. The
progress with regard to methodologies available to study this phenomenon, as well as the
strong interest in spontaneous thought from philosophical, psychological, and biological
traditions, renders this field an exciting area for integrated research and theory.
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